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Abstract
The approximation introduced by finite-precision representation of continuous data can
induce arbitrarily large information leaks even when the computation using exact se-
mantics is secure. Such leakage can thus undermine design efforts aimed at protecting
sensitive information. We focus here on differential privacy, an approach to privacy that
emerged from the area of statistical databases and is now widely applied also in other
domains. In this approach, privacy is protected by adding noise to the values correlated
to the private data. The typical mechanisms used to achieve differential privacy have
been proved correct in the ideal case in which computations are made using infinite-
precision semantics. In this paper, we analyze the situation at the implementation level,
where the semantics is necessarily limited by finite precision, i.e., the representation of
real numbers and the operations on them are rounded according to some level of preci-
sion. We show that in general there are violations of the differential privacy property,
and we study the conditions under which we can still guarantee a limited (but, arguably,
acceptable) variant of the property, under only a minor degradation of the privacy level.
Finally, we illustrate our results on two examples: the standard Laplacian mechanism
commonly used in differential privacy, and a bivariate version of it recently introduced
in the setting of privacy-aware geolocation.
Keywords: Differential privacy, floating-point arithmetic, robustness to errors.
1. Introduction
It is well known that, due to the physical limitations of actual machines, in partic-
ular the finiteness of their memory, real numbers and their operations cannot be imple-
mented with full precision. While for traditional computation getting an approximate
result is not critical when a bound on the error is known, we argue that, in security
and privacy applications, the approximation error can became a fingerprint potentially
causing the disclosure of secret or confidential information.
We investigate here the confidentiality issues caused by the use of finite precision.
More specifically, we study the information leaked about the input data that can be
caused by the errors in the result, assuming that the adversary knows the result and the
way the program works (because the program may be public, for example). The stan-
dard techniques to measure security breaches do not apply because those techniques
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analyze of the ideal system—i.e. using exact) semantics—and do not reveal the infor-
mation leaks caused by the implementation.
Consider, for instance, the following simple program
if f(h) > 0 then ` = 0 else ` = 1,
where h is a high (i.e., confidential) variable and ` is a low (i.e., public) variable.
Assume that h can take two values, v1 and v2, and that both f(v1) and f(v2) are
strictly positive. Then, in the ideal semantics, the program is perfectly secure, i.e. it
does not leak any information. However, in the implementation, it could be the case
that the test succeeds in the case of v1 but not in the case of v2 because, for instance, the
value of f(v2) is below the smallest representable positive number. Hence, we would
have a total disclosure of the secret value.
While the example above is elementary, it illustrates the pervasive nature of this
problem and the impact it can have on confidentiality. Clearly, the problem of working
without full precision should receive adequate treatment.
In this paper, we consider a more tricky case where the agent returns a noisy answer
by using random numbers. Often the addition of random noise is done on purpose to
prevent access to secret values. We will see that, however, since noises are generated
in finite precision, even noise contains computational errors that allows an attacker to
retrieve secrets.
In order to have concretes examples and to analyze existing specifications, we will
study here the particular case of using finite precision with differential privacy. Dif-
ferential privacy is an approach to the protection of private information in the field of
statistical databases. Statistical databases are databases containing individual records,
and aim at supporting the discovery of aggregate information, such as plausible causes
for diseases, social normal, or trends public opinion. Of course, statistical databases
have to preserve the anonymity and privacy of participants: It is likely that people will
not participate to a survey if they know that their personal information will be revealed
to anybody. However, as we explain in section 2.3, granting anonymity and privacy is
not a trivial task.
Differential privacy has been first proposed in [6, 7] as a formal approach to pre-
serve the anonymity and privacy of the participants in a statistical database. This ap-
proach is now being used in many other domains ranging from programming languages
[2, 8] to social networks [16] and geolocation [14, 11, 1].
The key idea behind differential privacy is that whenever someone queries a dataset,
the reported answer should not allow him to distinguish whether a certain individual
record is in the dataset or not. More precisely, the presence or absence of the record
should not change significantly the probability of obtaining a given answer. The stan-
dard way of achieving such a property is by using an oblivious mechanism1 which
consists in adding some noise to the true answer. Now the point is that, even if such a
mechanism is proved to provide the desired property in the ideal semantics, its imple-
mentation may induce errors that alter the least significant digits of the reported answer
1The name “oblivious” comes from the fact that the final answer depends only on the answer to the query
and not on the dataset.
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and cause significant privacy breaches. Let us illustrate the problem with an example.
Example 1.1. Consider the simplest representation of reals: fixed-point numbers. This
representation is used on low-cost processors which typically do not have a floating-
point arithmetic module. Each value is stored in a memory cell of fixed length. In
such cells, the last d digits represent the fractional part. Thus, if the value (interpreted
as an integer) stored in the cell is z, its semantics (i.e., the true real number being
represented) is z · 2−d.
To grant differential privacy, the standard technique consists in returning a random
value with probability p(x) = 1/2b · exp(−|x−r|/b) where r is the true result and b is
a scale parameter which depends on the degree of privacy to be obtained and on the
sensitivity of the query. The sensitivity of the query is the maximal difference in the
result when one entry is removed or added. To get a random variable with any specific
distribution, in general, we need to start with an initial random variable provided by
a primitive of the machine with a given distribution. To simplify the example, we
assume that the machine already provides a Laplacian random variable X with a scale
parameter 1. The probability distribution of such an X is pX(x) = 1/2 exp(−|x|).
Hence, if we want to generate the random variable bX with probability distribution
pbX(x) = 1/2b · exp(−|x|/b),
we can just multiply by b the value x = z · 2−d returned by the primitive.
Assume that we want to add noise with a scale parameter b = 2n for some fixed
integer n (b can be big when the sensitivity of the query and the required privacy degree
are high). In this case, the multiplication by 2n returns a number 2nz · 2−d that, in the
fixed-point representation, terminates with n zeroes. Hence, when we add this noise to
the true result, we return a value whose representation has the same n last digits as the
secret. For example, assume b = 22 = 4 and d = 6. Consider that the true answers are
r1 = 0 and r2 = 1 + 2−5. In the fixed-point representation, the last two digits of r1 are
00, and the last two digits of r2 are 10. Hence, even after we add the noise, it is still
possible to determine which was the true value between r1 or r2. Note that the same
example holds for every b = 2n and every pair of true values r1 and r2 which differ by
(2nk+h)/2d where k is any integer and h is any integer between 1 and 2n − 1. Figure 1
illustrates the situation for n = 2, b = 4, d = 6, k = 3 and h = 2. End of Example 1.1.
Another attack, based on the IEEE standard floating-point representation [12], was
presented in [15]. In contrast to [15], we have chosen an example based on the fixed
point representation because it allows to illustrate more distinctively a problem for
privacy which rises from the finite precision2 and which is, therefore, pandemic. This
is not the case for the example in [15]: fixed-point and integer-valued algorithms are
immune to that attack.
In this paper, we propose a solution to fix the privacy breach induced by the finite-
precision implementation of a differentially-private mechanism for any kind of imple-
mentation. Our main concern is to establish a bound on the degradation of privacy
2More precisely, the problem is caused by scaling a finite set of randomly generated numbers. It is easy
to prove that the problem raises for any implementation of numbers, although it may not raise for every point
like in the case of the fixed-point representation.
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Figure 1: The probability distribution of the reported answers after the addition of Laplacian noise PbX(x)
with b = 4, for the true answer r1 = 0 (black) and r2 = 3 · 2−4 + 2−5 (green).
induced by both the finite representation and by the computational errors in the gener-
ation of the noise. In order to achieve this goal, we use the concept of closeness which
allows us to reason about the approximation errors and their accumulation. In addi-
tion, we make as few assumptions as possible about the procedure for generating the
noise. In particular, we do not assume that the noise has a linear Laplacian distribution:
it can be any noise that provides differential privacy and whose implementation satis-
fies a few properties (normally granted by the implementation of real numbers) which
ensure its closeness. We illustrate our method with two examples: the classic case
of the univariate (i.e., linear) Laplacian, and the case of the bivariate Laplacian. The
latter distribution is used, for instance, to generate noise in privacy-aware geolocation
mechanisms [1].
1.1. Related work
Mironov has discovered independently the problem introduced by the finite pre-
cision in the implementation of differential privacy [15]. As already mentioned, that
paper showed an attack on the Laplacian-based implementation of differential privacy
within the IEEE standard floating-point representation3. To thwart such an attack, the
author of [15] proposed a method that avoids using the standard uniform random gen-
erator for floating point (because it does not draw all representable numbers but only
multiple of 2−52). Instead, his method generates two integers, one for the mantissa
and one for the exponent in such a way that every representable number is drawn with
its correct probability. Then it computes the linear Laplacian using a logarithm im-
plementation (assumed to be full-precision), and finally it uses a snapping mechanism
consisting in truncating large values and then rounding the final result.
The novelties of our work, w.r.t. [15], consist in the fact that we deal with a general
kind of noise, not necessarily the linear Laplacian, and with any kind of implementa-
3We discovered our attack independently, but [15] was published first.
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tion of real numbers, not necessarily the IEEE floating point standard. Furthermore,
our kind of analysis allows us to measure how safe an existing solution can be and
what to do if the requirements needed for the safety of this solution are not met. Fi-
nally, we provide a correct implementation of the bivariate Laplacian also as a valuable
contribution, given its practical usefulness for location-based applications.
The only other work we are aware of that considers both computational error and
differential privacy is [4]. However, that paper does not consider at all the problem
of the loss of privacy due to implementation error: rather, they develop a technique to
establish a bound on the error, and show that this technique can also be used to compute
the sensitivity of a query, which is a parameter of the Laplacian noise.
1.2. Plan of the paper
This paper is organized as follow. In section 2, we recall some mathematical defi-
nitions as well as the basis of differential privacy and we introduce some notation. In
section 3, we discuss how finite precision causes errors in the result of the algorithm.
We modify the initial algorithm in 3.5 to deal with some of these errors. In section
4, we use the bounds about the error found in the previous section to get a bound on
the increase of the  parameter due to the finite implementation. The two sections that
follow present some applications of our result: Section 5 illustrates the technique for
the case of Laplacian noise in one dimension and section 6 shows how our theorem
applies to the case of the Euclidean bivariate Laplacian. Section 7 concludes.
2. Preliminaries and notation
In this section, we recall some definitions and we introduce some notation that we
use throughout the paper.
2.1. Geometrical notations
There are several natural definitions of distance on Rm [17]. For m ∈ N and
x = (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Rm, the Lp norm of x, which we will denote by ‖x‖p, is de-
fined as ‖x‖p = p
√∑m
i=1 |xi|p. The corresponding distance function is dp(x, y) =
‖x − y‖p. We extend this norm and distance to p = ∞ in the usual way: ‖x‖∞ =
maxi∈{1,...,m} |xi| and d∞(x, y) = ‖x− y‖∞. The notion of L∞ norm is extended to
functions in the following way: given f : A→ Rm, we define ‖f‖p,∞ = maxx∈A ‖f(x)‖p.
When clear from the context, we will omit the parameter p and write simply ‖x‖,
d(x, y) and ‖f‖∞ for ‖x‖p, dp(x, y) and ‖f‖p,∞ respectively.
Let S ⊆ Rm. The diameter of S is defined as (S) = maxx,y∈S d(x, y). For
x ∈ Rm, the translations of S by x and −x are defined as S + x = {y + x | y ∈ S}
and S − x = {y − x | y ∈ S} where + and − are the vectorial spaces operators.
Definition 2.1. We define the expansion of the set S by r ∈ R+ : expand(S,+r) =
{x | ∃s ∈ S, d(x, s) ≤ r} and the shrinking of the set S by r ∈ R+: expand(S,−r) =
{x | ∀s ∈ Rm, d(x, s) ≤ r =⇒ s ∈ S}.
Note that these two definitions are related as follows: Rm \ expand(S,−) =
expand(Rm \ S,+).
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2.2. Probability and measure theory
In this section, we recall the basic notions of measure theory.
Definition 2.2 (σ-algebra and measurable space). A σ-algebra T for a set M is a
nonempty set of subsets of M that is closed under complementation (wrt to M ) and
(potentially empty) enumerable union. The tuple (M, T ) is called a measurable space.
On Rm, we denote by S the Lebesgue’s σ-algebra that contains all hypercube.
Definition 2.3 (Probability space). A probability space is a tuple (Ω,F , P ) where Ω is
a sample space (i.e., the set of all possible outcomes), F is a set of events (where each
event is a set of zero or more outcomes) which is also a σ-algebra on Ω, and P is a
probability measure on (Ω,F) (i.e., a measure such that P (Ω) = 1).
Definition 2.4 (Random variable). Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space and (E, E) be
a measurable space. Then a random variable is a measurable function X : Ω → E.
We shall use the expression P [X ∈ B] to denote P (X−1(B)).
Definition 2.5 (Support). The support of a measure is the set of all xwhere the measure
of some neighborhood of x is not null. By extension, the support of a random variable
X is the support of its corresponding measure.
We will make use of the Lebesgue measure λ on (Rm,S) where S is the Lebesgue
σ-algebra. This is the standard way of assigning a measure to subsets of Rm.
In this paper, we use the following general definition of the Laplace distribution
(centered at zero).
Definition 2.6 (Laplace distribution). The density function F of a Laplace distribution
with scale parameter b is Fb(x) = K(b) exp(−b‖x‖) where K(b) is a normalization
factor which is determined by imposing
∫
S
Fb(x) dx = 1.
2.3. Differential privacy
In this section, we recall the definition of differential privacy on databases. We will
denote by D the set of all possible databases. We start by formalizing the notion of
presence versus non-presence of an individual.
Definition 2.7 (adjacent databases). Given two databases D1 and D2 in D, we denote
byD1 ∼ D2 the fact thatD1 andD2 differ by exactly one row. Namely, D2 is obtained
from D1 by adding or removing the data of one individual.
In order to protect the private data of an individual, the differential privacy frame-
work uses randomization to obfuscate the answers to queries.
Definition 2.8 (randomized mechanism). A randomized mechanism K is a function
that takes a database D in D and a query q and returns a random variable X: X =
Kq(D). We omit the q parameter when there is no ambiguity.
We can now provide the formal definition of differential privacy. The idea is that
the probability of obtaining a certain answer to the query is almost the same whether an
individual is present or not, hence the answer does not provide too much probabilistic
information about the data of the individual.
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Definition 2.9 (-differential privacy). A randomized mechanism K : D → Rm is -
differentially private if for all databasesD1 andD2 inD withD1 ∼ D2, and all S ∈ S
(the Lebesgue σ-algebra on Rm), we have :
P [K(D1) ∈ S] ≤ exp()P [K(D2) ∈ S]
2.4. Standard technique to implement differential privacy
We will focus on the so-called oblivious mechanisms, which are the most used, and
are defined as follow.
Definition 2.10 (oblivious mechanisms). A mechanism is oblivious if it is obtained by
applying a random function to the true answer to the query, i.e., not directly to the
database. We use the notation fq(D) to denote the true answer on the database D and
f(D) when there is no ambiguity about q.
To calibrate the noise of an oblivious mechanism we do not need to consider the
databases anymore, the only interesting parameter is the maximal deviation that one
individual can generate for a given query. This leads to the following definition.
Definition 2.11 (sensitivity). The sensitivity ∆f of a function f : D → Rm is
∆f = sup
D1, D2 ∈ D
D1 ∼ D2
d(f(D1), f(D2)).
We are interested in the particular case of oblivious mechanisms that only add a
random value to the result. These are the most common oblivious mechanisms and we
will limit our study to them.
Mechanism 1.
K(D) = f(D) +X (1)
Another important feature of a mechanism is its utility. For instance, a function
that only returns a random variable is 0-differential private but since it never allows to
learn anything, as a mechanism it would be perfectly useless. In the case of an additive
mechanism the utility can be defined as a function of the variance between the true
answer and the real value.
A mechanism that offers a good trade-off between privacy and utility is the so-
called Laplacian mechanism, which is defined as in (1), where X is a Laplacian cali-
brated by  and the sensitivity of the query. Namely, the density function of X is Fb(x)
(cf. Definition 2.6) with b = ∆fq/.
3. Measuring the computational error
This section aims at measuring and bounding the computational errors that the
finite semantics induces in the implementation of the mechanism. First, we discuss
the influence of the error in the function computing the true answer. Then, we analyze
the deviation between a theoretical perfect random generator and a pseudo random
generator in finite precision. Finally, we show that the straightforward implementation
is not safe and we provide a solution to fix that problem.
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3.1. Approximate computation of the true answer to the query
Let f be the function computing the true answer of the query, and f ′ its implemen-
tation in finite precision.
The difference between f ′ and f may affect the utility of the answer, but in general
it does not influence the level of differential privacy. In particular, in the case of an
oblivious mechanism, the way the deviation on f influences the level of privacy is only
via the features of f that are used for the computation of the noise. Typically such
feature is the sensitivity of the query, ∆f . For example, the definition of Laplacian
noise depends on the parameter b which is ∆f .
3.2. Implementation of real valued random variables
Computer systems usually provide a primitive that implements a random variable
U of range [0, 1[ with uniform distribution4. Other random variables and their density
functions can usually be defined as functions of this U . For instance X = n(U) =
4U − 2 is a uniform random variable of range [−2, 2[. For random variable whose
support (co-domain) is in Rn, the definition can make use of a tuple U of several inde-
pendent uniform random variables U1, . . . , Um. For instance, (X,Y ) = n(U1, U2) =
(U2 cos(2piU1), U2 sin(2piU1)) is a random variable whose support is the unit disc.
In this paper, we assume that the implementation of the noise in Mechanism 1 is
based on such U and n. Hence, we only consider mechanisms in which the random
function X of (1) is of the form n(U):
Mechanism 2.
Kn(D) = f(D) + n(U) (2)
In the following we consider the errors introduced by the emulations of those U
and n in finite precision.
3.3. Error due to the initial random generator
A perfect uniform random generator would generate any value in [0, 1[ with uni-
form distribution. However, since the implementation can only returns values with
a finite precision, the distribution is not uniform. Here we study how this deviation
influences the error in the mechanism.
We denote by U the tuple ofm uniform random variables used to generate the noise
in the exact semantics. In other words, U is a uniform random variable in [0, 1[m. We
denote by U ′ the pseudo random variable in [0, 1[m generated in the finite precision
semantics. To model the error, we consider U ′ = n0(U) where n0 is a measurable
function of type [0, 1[m→ [0, 1[m that maps any u ∈ [0, 1[m to the finite set of possible
outputs of our pseudo random generator. In summary, U,U ′ are random variables of
type Ω→ [0, 1[m, and U ′(ω) = n0(U(ω)).
4In general, a machine provides a pseudo-random generator U , not a “real” random one. However the
question of the reliability of pseudo randomness is out of the scope of this paper, so we will assume that U
is really random.
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For instance, if our precision allows to represent only numbers that are multiples of
2−53, then we can model U ′ with the function n0 that takes a real number and truncates
it after the 53th decimal bit.
We will use δ0 to denote the error due to this initial random generator:
Definition 3.1. The initial error δ0 ∈ R+ is the maximal distance between n0(u) and
u for any u ∈ [0, 1[m :
δ0 = ‖n0 − Id‖∞.
where Id is the identity function.
For instance, in case U ′ generates numbers that are multiple of δ, we have δ0 = δ.
In our previous example we have δ = 253.
3.4. Errors due to the transformation function
We now consider the error in the implementation of the function n which is used
to transform the initial uniform U into a noise n(U) with the desired distribution. We
denote by n′ the actual function resulting by implementing n in finite-precision. and
by X ′ = n′(U ′) = n′(n0(U)) the random variable actually generated.
In order to bound the maximal error between the result generated by the implemen-
tation and the exact one, we use the notion of closeness that was defined in [9].
Definition 3.2 ((k, δ)-closedness, [9]). Let A and B be metric spaces with distance dA
and dB , respectively. Let n and n′ be two functions from A to B and let k, δ ∈ R+. We
say that n′ is (k, δ)-close to n if
∀u, v ∈ A, dB(n(u), n′(v)) ≤ k dA(u, v) + δ.
The closeness property is related to the one of being k-Lipschitz, as shown in [9]:
Proposition 3.1 ([9]). If n is k-Lipschitz and ‖n− n′‖∞ ≤ δ then n and n′ are (k, δ)-
close.
Corollary 3.1. n0 and Id are (1, δ0)-close.
Proof From Definition 3.1, the fact Id is 1-Lipschitz, and Proposition 3.1.
If also n and n′ were (k, δ)-close for some k, then, by compositionality we could
derive that n and n′◦n0 are (k, kδ0 +δ)-close as well, and this would allow to establish
a bound on the divergence between K and its implementation K′.
Unfortunately, n and n′ are not (k, δ)-close. To show this, we start with the fol-
lowing lemma which states that in a differentially private mechanism, if the noise is
additive, then its amplitude is unbounded.
Lemma 3.1. If a mechanism of the form (1) is differentially private, and there exist
at least two adjacent databases where the query has two different answers, then the
support of X has infinite diameter.
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Proof Let r1 and r2 different answers on two adjacent databases. Let M ∈ S (the
set of measurable sets) such that ‖M‖ is bounded and P (X ∈ M) > 0. By definition
of translations (cfr. Section 2.1), we also have P (r1 + X ∈ M + r1) > 0. Since K
is -differentially private, we must have P (r2 +X ∈ M + r1) > 0 as well, otherwise
the ratio between the two probabilities would be infinite. Hence we have shown that
P (X ∈ M) > 0 =⇒ P (X ∈ M + r1 − r2) > 0. Since this is valid for any M , we
have in particular that for any h ∈ N, P (X ∈M+h(r1−r2)) > 0 =⇒ P (X ∈M+
(h+ 1)(r1− r2)) > 0. From the assumption P (X ∈M) > 0 and the last implication,
we conclude, by induction, that for all h ∈ N, P (X ∈M + h(r1 − r2)) > 0.
Finally, since M is bounded, for any r ∈ R there exists a h such that
{x ∈ Rm | d(0, x) ≤ r} ∩M + h(r1 − r2) = ∅ (3)
where 0 is the origin. (Note that {x ∈ [0, 1[m| d(0, x) ≤ r} is the ball centered in
0 of radius r.) This means that the set M + h(r1 − r2) does not have any element
x with d(0, x) ≤ r. In summary, we have exhibited sets (M + h(r1 − r2)) with non
null probability which are arbitrarily far from the origin. We can conclude that, for all
s ∈ R, P (X > s) > 0.
Finally, we show that indeed the deviation caused by the finite precision, in the
implementation of the noise, is unbounded:
Theorem 3.1. If a mechanism of the form (2) is differentially private, then there is no
δ ∈ R such that
∀u ∈ [0, 1[m, d((n′ ◦ n0)(u), n(u)) ≤ δ
Proof Since there is only a finite set of possible values n0(u) for u ∈ [0, 1[m, there
exists a maximum value xM = max{‖n′(n0(u))‖ | u ∈ [0, 1[m}. From Lemma 3.1,
we have that, for every δ ∈ R, there exists u ∈ [0, 1[m such that ‖n(u)‖ > δ + xM ,
and therefore d(n(u), n′(n0(u))) > k.
In Figure 2, we illustrate the problem pointed out by Theorem 3.1, and the conse-
quent impossibility for the implementation to achieve differential privacy on the whole
domain of a mechanism of the form (2). We have considered a noise n defined so that
the ideal mechanism would be 0.2-differentially private, and we have simulated the
distribution of the corresponding noise generated in fixed precision (where errors has
been overplayed). The black and the green curves represent the right branch of the dis-
tributions f(D1) +n′(n0(U)) and f(D2) +n′(n0(U)) respectively, where f(D1) = 0
and f(D2) = 1. They are step functions: each step represents the probability for a
given representable value. As we can see, while the ratio between the two distributions
is (almost) exp(0.25) around 0, when the mechanism returns a larger noise the ratio
becomes much higher, and for the value xM defined in the proof of Theorem 3.1 we
have P (f(D1) + n′(n0(U)) > xM ) = 0 while P (f(D2) + n′(n0(U)) > xM ) 6= 0,
which means that the ratio is infinite.
3.5. Truncating the result
In this section we discuss how to modify the mechanism so to be able to bound the
difference between n and n′ ◦ n0. One way of doing this is by truncating the result.
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Figure 2: The effect of the finiteness of n0(U) on the implementation of the noise
Some differentially private mechanisms already use a truncation procedure. The
idea is the following: choose a subset Mr ⊂ Rm (domain of interest) and, whenever
the reported answer x is outside Mr, return the closest point to x in Mr. In the exact
semantics the truncation is safe, in the sense that it has been proved that it does not
alter differential privacy. However, the fact n and n′ are not close means that we cannot
expect the properties of n to be transferred to n′. Indeed, there are cases in which this
method is not safe in the finite-precision semantics, unless we make strong assumptions
on the computational errors. Since we are trying to be as general as possible, we
cannot use this kind of truncation.5 Hence, we adopt the following simple approach:
Whenever the result is outside the intended subsetMr of Rm, we return an exception.
This truncation method is quite drastic in the sense that all values outside Mr are
collapsed in the same value (the “exception”). The advantage is that under relatively
mild assumptions we can prove that this method is safe in all cases. On the other hand,
the loss of utility is higher than in the standard method mentioned above. Better mech-
anisms can be found, but they are specific to some algorithms or to some dimensions.
For instance, we will show later that in the uni-dimensional case (m = 1) it is possible
to return an extremal value.
We denote by ∞ the exception, i.e., the value returned by the mechanism when
f(D) + n(U) /∈Mr. Hence, the truncated mechanism KMr is defined as:
Mechanism 3.
KMr (D) =
{
Kn(D) if Kn(D) ∈Mr
∞ otherwise
We now present the conditions that ensure the the above mechanism is safe. The
first one is that for a suitable Mr ⊂ Rm there exist a domain Ur ⊂ [0, 1[m such that
5Note that redrawing a new random value, when the result is outsideMr , would not be a solution, because
it would change the distribution in a way that may cause the loss of differential privacy.
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n and n′ are close in Ur, while outside Ur the result determined by n falls out of (the
expansion of)Mr, and hence gets truncated.
Condition 1. For some k and δn in R+, and sets Ur ⊂ [0, 1[m andMr ⊂ Rm
(i) n and n′ are (k, δn)-close on Ur
(ii) ∀u /∈ Ur, f(D) + n(u) /∈ expand(Mr,+kδ0 + δn)
The above condition may look strong, but in fact it is a quite reasonable assumption.
For instance, it is granted when ‖f‖∞ < ∞ and n is absolutely continuous. In such
case, indeed, we can construct k, δn, Ur andMr in the following way.
Construction 3.1. First choose Ur to be a closed subset of [0, 1[m.6 Then set k to
be the maximal value for the derivative of n in Ur, whose existence is ensured by the
absolute continuity of n, and set δn to be a bound for ‖n−n′‖∞ inUr. 7 Finally, choose
Mr to be the largest set that satisfies Ur ⊆ n−1(expand(Mr,+‖f‖∞ + kδ0 + δn)).
Proposition 3.2. k, δn, Ur andMr defined in Construction 3.1 satisfy Condition 1.
Proof The first part of Condition 1 follows from Proposition 3.1. For the second part,
let f(D) + n(u) ∈ expand(Mr,+kδ0 + δn). Then n(u) ∈ expand(Mr,+‖f‖∞ +
kδ0 + δn) and therefore u ∈Mr.
Previous condition ensures that the implementation of the noise behaves well inside
Ur, and that outside Ur we don’t need to worry about the value of n because the result
(in the ideal semantics) gets truncated. However, we still need to worry about the
result of n′ outside Ur, because nobody ensures that the result gets truncated also in
the implementation. More precisely, it could be that for some value outside Ur, n′
returns a value inside Mr. To avoid this, we require implementation to be monotonic
with respect to the ideal semantics (Condition 2).
Another way to understand the necessity of the monotonicity condition is the fol-
lowing: If we do not require this property, we could have an implementation of n′ such
that for all u /∈Mr, n′(u) = 0. Such an implementation would be valid with respect to
Condition 1 because we do not ask for closeness of n and n′ outside of Ur. Then, for
all u /∈ Ur, K′Mr (D)(u) = f ′(D) will not be truncated if the domain of f ′ is a subset
of Mr and therefore the probability that the returned answer by K′Mr is just the true
answer become much higher than expected.
Condition 2. The implementation respects the order. Namely, for every function g :
Rj → Rk and its implementation g′, for all x ∈ Rj and y ∈ Rj , g(x)i ≤ g(y)i implies
g′(x)i ≤ g′(y)i where for i ∈ [1, k] zi is the projection of z on the ith component.
Finally, the algorithm makes a test to check whether the result is in Mr. Let t be
the test function, i.e., t(x) = 1 if x ∈Mr and t(x) = 0 otherwise. The implementation
6The choice of Ur influences the utility and the optimal set could be obtained by a fixpoint construction,
but this is out of the scope of this paper.
7When n is a well-known function, often there exist implementations which are full precision, in the
sense that the error is only due to the fact the result has been rounded to the nearest representable number. In
such case computing δn is easy.
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t′ in general does not coincide with t, and therefore it accepts a set Mr ′ = t′−1({1})
different fromMr. Hence, we need to ensure that the implementation of the test is safe,
namely that in the implementation we do the truncation every time that we would do it
in the ideal semantics. This can be ensured with the following condition.
Condition 3. The test t′ is such that for all x ∈ Rm, t(x) = 0 implies t′(x) = 0 i.e.
Mr ′ ⊆Mr.
We are now able to provide a bound on the maximal error of the implementation.
Note that the error between n and n′ ◦n0(u) can be bound only inside Ur, but it will be
convenient to consider instead a variant of the implementation, n˜′◦n˜0, which coincides
with n′ ◦ n0(u) inside Ur and coincides with n outside. The advantage is that n˜′ ◦ n˜0
is close to n in all the domain. From the point of view of the implementation of the
whole mechanism it is not a problem to replace n′ ◦ n0(u) by n˜′ ◦ n˜0, because outside
Ur the result is truncated anyway.
Definition 3.3. The mechanism K˜′n is defined as K˜′n(D) = f ′(D)+ n˜′ ◦ n˜0(U), where
n˜′, n˜0 are defined so to satisfy the following:
n˜′ ◦ n˜0(u) =
{
n′ ◦ n0(u) if u ∈ Ur
n(u) otherwise
Proposition 3.3. When Conditions 1, 2 and 3 hold, the implementation K′Mr ′ of Mech-
anism 3 satisfies the following:
K′Mr ′(D) =
{
K˜′n(D) if K˜′n(D) ∈Mr ′
∞ otherwise
and K˜′n is δt-close to the mechanism in the ideal semantics, in the sense that
∀u ∈ [0, 1[m, d(f ′(D) + n(u), f ′(D) + n˜′ ◦ n˜0(u)) ≤ δt
where δt = kδ0 + δn.
Proof By Condition 1 (ii) we have ∀D,∀u /∈ Ur, f(D)+n(u) /∈ expand(Mr,+kδ0+
δn). Then by Condition 1 (i) and Condition 3 we haveMr ′ ⊆ f(D) +n′ ◦n0(Ur). By
Condition 2 we derive ∀u /∈ Ur, f(D)+n′ ◦n0(u) /∈Mr ′. Since n′ ◦n0(u) and n˜′ ◦ n˜0
coincide onUr, we have that for all u ∈ Ur, t′(f(D)+n′◦n0(u)) = t′(f(D)+n˜′◦n˜0).
Moreover K˜′n(D)(u) ∈ Mr ′ implies u ∈ Ur and therefore f ′(D) + n˜′ ◦ n˜0(U) =
f ′(D) + n′ ◦ n0(U). So the first part of the proposition is proven.
For the second part, we recall that n˜′ and n are (k, δn)-close on Ur. Therefore by
composition of closeness with n0, and since n˜′ ◦ n˜0 = n′ ◦ n0 on Ur, we have the
property on Ur. Then, since n˜′ ◦ n˜0 = n on [0, 1[m\Ur, we have the property on the
whole domain [0, 1[m.
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4. Quantification of the loss of differential privacy due to computational errors
In the previous section we have provided a bound δt on the computational error.
In this section, we use this bound to quantify the loss of differential privacy. First, we
explain how to get bounds on probabilities from bounds on computational errors. Then,
we show that Mechanism 3 is still not safe and we propose a solution. Finally we show
that the implementation of the resulting mechanism is differentially private, although
there is a degradation in the level of privacy with respect to the original (ideal) one, and
we provide a bound on such degradation.
4.1. Modeling the error as a distance between distributions
Given that we are in a probabilistic setting, it is not so useful to measure the errors
due to the finite representation in terms of numerical difference. We should rather
measure them in terms of distance between the theoretical distribution and the actual
distribution. In this way, we will be able to establish a link with differential privacy,
which is indeed, basically, a notion of distance between distributions.
In the literature one can find many definitions of distance between distributions.
Here we consider the ∞-Wassertein distance [3] since, as we will see, it has a direct
relation with differential privacy. We will use Γ(µ, ν) to denote the set of all measures
on Rm × Rm with marginal µ and ν respectively. Namely, every γ ∈ Γ(µ, ν) is a
measure such that
γ(S × Rm) = µ(S) (left marginal) and γ(Rm × S) = ν(S) (right marginal)
We also denote by supp(γ), the set of points where γ is non zero.
Definition 4.1 (∞-Wassertein distance [3]). Let µ, ν be two probability measures on
(Rm,S) for which there exists a compact C such that µ(C) = ν(C) = 1 (i.e, the
support of µ and ν is bounded). The∞-Wassertein distance between µ and ν is defined
as:
W∞(µ, ν) = inf
γ∈Γ(µ,ν)
(
sup
(x,y)∈supp(γ)
d(x, y)
)
We extend this definition to any pair of measures µ and ν that differs only on a
compact (Mr in our case) by restricting Γ(µ, ν) to be null on all set X × Y such that
X ∩ Y = ∅, X ⊂ Rm \Mr and Y ⊂ Rm \Mr.
We can now quantify the distance between two random variables:
Proposition 4.1. Let X and X ′ be two random variables Ω→ Rm with distribution µ
and ν respectively. We have that ‖X −X ′‖∞ ≤ δ implies W∞(µ, ν) ≤ δ.
Proof Let A,B be two measurable sets distant by more than δ, namely: ∀a ∈ A, b ∈
B, d(a, b) > δ. Then ‖X − X ′‖∞ ≤ δ implies that there is no ω ∈ Ω such that
X(ω) ∈ A and X ′(ω) ∈ B. Hence P (X ∈ A ∧ X ′ ∈ B) is null which means that the
support of (µ, ν) does not include any such pair of sets (A,B), and therefore we can
construct a γ ∈ Γ(µ, ν) such that sup(x,y)∈supp(γ) d(x, y) ≤ δ.
The following proposition allows us to use the ∞-Wassertein distance between µ
and ν to establish a bound on µ in terms of ν.
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Proposition 4.2. Let µ, ν be two probability measures on Rm. Then:
W∞(µ, ν) ≤ δ =⇒ ∀S ∈ S, µ(expand(S,−δ)) ≤ ν(S) ≤ µ(expand(S,+δ))
Proof Let γ ∈ Γ(µ, ν). Since ν is the right marginal of γ, ν(S) = ∫Rm×S dγ(x, y).
Since γ(x, y) = 0 if d(x, y) > δ, we derive ν(S) =
∫
expand(S,+δ)×S dγ(x, y). There-
fore, ν(S) ≤ ∫
expand(S,+δ)×Rm dγ(x, y). The last expression is the left marginal of γ
in expand(S,+δ), hence by definition: ν(S) ≤ µ(expand(S,+δ)).
The other inequality is obtained by replacing S with Rm \ S.
We can now provide upper and lower bounds on the probabilities of the imple-
mented noise in terms of those in the exact semantics and the computational error δt:
Corollary 4.1. Let µ, ν be the probability measures of n(U), n˜′ ◦ n˜0(U), respectively.
Namely, for all S ∈ S (where we recall that S is the set of measurable sets in [0, 1[m),
µ(S) = P [n(U) ∈ S] and ν(S) = P [n˜′ ◦ n˜0(U) ∈ S]. Then, for all S ∈ S:
µ(expand(S,−δt)) ≤ ν(S) ≤ µ(expand(S,+δt))
Proof By Proposition 3.3 and Proposition 4.1 it follows that W∞(µ, ν) ≤ δt. Then
apply Proposition 4.2.
However, used carelessly, the lower bound provided by the previous corollary is
not accurate enough. There is in fact a problem when S is too small: expand(S,−δt)
can be much smaller than S or even be the empty set. Consequently, the probability
of the returned answer to be in expand(S,−δt) will be close to 0, or even 0. Since
differential privacy is about ratio, this case would not have a suitable bound. Note that
this is exactly the problem described in Example 1.1.
4.2. Rounding the answer
In the last paragraph of previous section we pointed out a problem for differential
privacy that may arise when the analyst measure sets that are too small. The most
natural way to solve this problem consists in rounding the answer, which has the effect
of collapsing all values from a neighborhood into a unique value. In this approach, once
the computation of KMr (D) is achieved, we do not return the answer but a “rounding”
of the answer through a function rnd, whose implementation rnd′ is defined as any
measurable function that maps all values of Mr into some finite subset F of Mr, such
that ∀x ∈ F, rnd′(x) = x and such that rnd′(∞) =∞.
If two values close to the boundary of Mr are rounded to the same one but one is
truncated while not the other one, some problematic behaviors can happen. To avoid
that we add an additional condition about rnd′ andMr ′.
Condition 4. The function rnd′ is such that rnd′−1(F ) = Mr ′.
Remark 1. To achieve this property we assume we already getMr0 that have all other
properties (it may have been obtained with the method in Construction 3.1) and that
rnd′ is a rounding function forMr0 which maps to F0. Then we buildMr ⊆Mr0 that
have Condition 4. We define L = maxx∈F0 (rnd′−1(x)). Then Condition 4 hold for
any setMr ′ = rnd′−1(Mr1) whereMr1 ⊆ expand(Mr ′0,−L)).
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Proof We have at first rnd′ such that all values of Mr0 maps to F0, Since Mr1 ⊆
expand(Mr ′0,−L)) we have rnd′−1(Mr1) ⊆Mr0Mr ′ ⊆Mr0 and so rnd′−1(Mr ′) ⊆
Mr0. We considerF = rnd′(Mr1), sinceMr1 ⊆Mr0, rnd′ satisfies ∀x ∈ F, rnd′(x) =
x and all values ofMr ′ maps toMr1 rnd′ satisfies all other conditions.
On the other hand, Condition 4 can be rewritten as: rnd′−1(rnd(Mr1)) = rnd′
′−1(Mr1).
Since rnd′(Mr1) ⊆Mr1 we have rnd′−1(rnd(Mr1)) ⊆ rnd′′−1(Mr1). For the other
inclusion, if x ∈ rnd′′−1(Mr1), rnd′(rnd′(x)) ∈ Mr1 since rnd′ is idempotent on
Mr0 and rnd′−1(Mr1) ⊆Mr0. This means that x ∈ rnd′−1(rnd′(Mr1)).
Mechanism 4. Our final mechanism is rnd(KMr ), where rnd is a rounding function.
Although the sets corresponding to the elements of F form a finite collection, it
will be convenient, for the sake of uniformity, to consider them as the generators of
a σ-algebra. Hence, we define S ′0 = {rnd′−1(x)|x ∈ F}, and S ′ as the σ-algebra
generated by S ′0. Our mechanism allows us to restrict our analysis of probabilities only
to S ′.
Proposition 4.3. ∀S ∈ S ′, P [K′Mr ′(D1) ∈ S] ≤ exp(′)P [K′Mr ′(D2) ∈ S] implies
rnd′(K′Mr ′) is ′-differentially private :∀S ∈ S, P [rnd′(K′Mr ′)(D1) ∈ S] ≤ exp(′)P [rnd′(K′Mr ′)(D2) ∈ S].
Proof The image of K′Mr ′ is Mr ′ ∪ ∞ so the image of rnd′(K′Mr ′) is F ∪ {∞}.
Therefore, for any set S ∈ S, P (rnd′(K′Mr ′) ∈ S) = P (rnd′(K′Mr ′) ∈ S ∩ (F ∪{∞})). Which is equivalent to , P (rnd′(K′Mr ′) ∈ S) = P (rnd′(K′Mr ′) ∈ (S ∩ F ) ∪
(S ∩ {∞})). This can be rewritten as P (rnd′(K′Mr ′) ∈ S) = P (K′Mr ′ ∈ rnd′−1(S ∩
F ) ∪ rnd′−1(S ∩ {∞})). Since Condition 4 ensures that rnd′−1(F ) ⊆ Mr ′, for all
S ⊆ F , rnd′(K′Mr ′)−1(rnd−1(S)) = K′Mr ′
−1
(rnd−1(S)). Then since Condition
4 ensures that rnd′−1(F ) ⊇ Mr ′, rnd′(K′Mr ′)−1({∞}) = K′Mr ′
−1
({∞}). From
these two equalities, we get P (rnd′(K′Mr ′) ∈ S) = P (K′Mr ′ ∈ rnd′−1(S ∩ F ) ∪
rnd′−1(S ∩ {∞})). This can be rewritten as: P (rnd′(K′Mr ′) ∈ S) = P (K′Mr ′ ∈
rnd′−1(S ∩ (F ∪ {∞}))). Since for all S ∈ S, rnd′−1(S ∩ (F ∪ {∞})) ∈ S ′, we get
the implication.
We now quantify the efficiency of the rounding function with respect to helping in
establishing bounds on ratios between the probability measures of the implementation.
To this purpose, we introduce the notion of ratio between the bounds established in
Corollary 4.1. This notion will be used in Theorem 4.1.
Definition 4.2 (Rounding ratio). We defineR to be the maximal ratio between the areas
expand(S,+δt) and expand(S,−δt) over all values that can be returned:
R = max
S∈S′0\∅
λ(expand(S, δt) \ expand(S,−δt))
λ(expand(S,−δt)) (4)
Where λ is the Lebesgue measure on Rm.
The R defined by (4) may look quite hard to compute, however, when rnd is par-
ticularly regular, we can bound R from above:
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Proposition 4.4. Assume the rounding function rndl : Rm → Rm is defined as
rndl(x1, . . . , xm) = (blx1c/l, . . . , blxmc/l). Then,
R ≤
(
l + 2δt
l − 2δt
)m
− 1
Proof With such a rounding, the space is split in hypercubes C of uniform size l.
Therefore expand(C, δt) is included in a hypercube of size l+2δt and expand(C,−δt)
is exactly a hypercube of size l − 2δt. The Lebesgue measure of an hypercube of size
s is by definition sm. Hence the measure of expand(C,−δt) is (l − 2δt)m and the
measure of expand(C, δt) \ expand(C,−δt) is (l + 2δt)m − (l − 2δt)m.
4.3. Strengthening the differential privacy property
The last issue, in order to be able to quantify the loss due to the finite precision,
comes from the definition of differential privacy. This definition relies on the definition
of sensitivity in the exact semantics while here we need the sensitivity in the finite pre-
cision semantics. More precisely, if the noise has a density function p, then differential
privacy can be expressed by the following inequality.
∀x, y ∈ Rm, d(x, y) ≤ ∆f =⇒ p(x) ≤ exp()p(y) (5)
In the past sections we have been able to establish a relation between the implemented
noise p′ and the ideal noise p, but we do not know anything about the relation between
the implemented sensitivity ∆f ′ and the ideal one, ∆f , so we cannot use (5) directly
to derive conclusions about the level of privacy satisfied by the implementation.
There are several ways to solve this problem. Here, we choose to constrain the
distribution of X . Indeed, when using a Laplace distribution (which is the most used,
adding this constraint allows us to keep the bound as accurate as if there was no problem
about the distribution.
Condition 5. Given a mechanism K(D) = f(D) + X we say that K satisfies condi-
tion 5 with parameter  (the desired parameter of differential privacy) if the random
variable X has a probability distribution which is absolutely continuous according to
the Lebesgue measure, and
∀S ∈ S, r1, r2 ∈ Rm, P [r1 +X ∈ S] ≤ exp(d(r1,r2)/∆f)P [r2 +X ∈ S]
This property is actually stronger than differential privacy as we state in the follow-
ing proposition.
Proposition 4.5. Condition 5 implies that the mechanism K(D) = f(D) + X is -
differentially private.
Proof Let D1 and D2 be two databases such that D1 ∼ D2. Let r1 = f(D1)
and r2 = f(D2) be two answers. By definition of sensitivity, d(r1, r2) ≤ ∆f so
exp(d(r1,r2)/∆f) ≤ exp(). Hence, P [K(D1) ∈ S] ≤ exp()P [K(D2) ∈ S].
We chose this condition because in case the noise has a Laplacian distribution then
the converse of Proposition 4.5 holds and therefore in this case Condition 5 and differ-
ential privacy are equivalent.
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Proposition 4.6. Let K(D) = f(D) + X be a mechanism, and assume that X is
Laplacian. If K is -differentially private (w.r.t. f ), then Condition 5 holds.
Proof First, we show that if K is -differentially private then b ≤ /∆f holds for
the scale parameter b of X . Let D1 ∼ D2 with d(f(D1), f(D2)) = ∆f . By -
differential privacy we have, for any S ∈ S: P [f(D1) +X ∈ S] ≤ exp()P [f(D2) +
X ∈ S]. From the density function of the Laplace noise (Definition 2.6), we derive:
K(n, d)dλ ≤ exp()K(n, d) exp(−b∆f )dλ. Hence,
b ≤ /∆f . (6)
Now, by definition of the density function, we have:
P [r2 + X ∈ S] =
∫
x∈S K(n, d) exp(−bd(x, r2))dλ. From the triangular inequality,
we derive: P [r2 +X ∈ S] ≥
∫
x∈S K(n, d) exp(−b(d(x, r1) + d(r1, r2)))dλ. Hence,
P [r2 + X ∈ S] ≥ exp(−bd(r2, r1))
∫
x∈S exp(−bd(r1, x))dλ. From inequality (6),
we derive: P [r2 + X ∈ S] ≥ exp(−d(r2,r1)/∆f)
∫
x∈S exp(−bd(r1, x))dλ. Finally,
P [r2 +X ∈ S] ≥ exp(−d(r2,r1)/∆f)P [r1 +X ∈ S].
4.4. Preserving differential privacy
Now we have established all necessary conditions and we can finally state our main
theorem.
Theorem 4.1. If mechanism rnd(KMr ) (Mechanism 4) has an implementation rnd′(K′Mr ′)
such that conditions 2, 1, 3 and 4 hold and the density function of n(U) satisfies con-
dition 5, then the implemented mechanism is ′-differentially private, namely:
∀S ∈ S, P [rnd(KMr )′(D1) ∈ S] ≤ exp(′)P [rnd(KMr )′(D2) ∈ S]
where
′ = + ln(1 +R exp((L+δt)/∆f′))
with R corresponds to Definition 4.2, L = maxS∈S′0 S and δt as defined in Proposi-
tion 3.3.
Proof According to Proposition 4.3, we only have to consider the Mechanism 2 on
the sigma algebra S ′. Moreover since S ′ is generated by a finite number of disjoint
sets, we only have to prove the property for all S ∈ S ′0. In fact we will prove the
property only for all S ∈ S ′0 \ {∞}. Indeed, once this has been proved the fact that
P (rnd(KMr )′(Di) ∈ {∞}) = 1−P (rnd(KMr )′(Di) ∈
⋃
S∈{S′0\{∞}} S) implies the
property for {∞}.
So, we consider S ∈ S ′0 \ {∞}. In that case, K′Mr ′ = K˜′n. We define P1 =
P [K˜′n(D1) ∈ S] and P2 = P [K˜′n(D2) ∈ S]. Since ν is the measure associated to
n˜′ ◦ n˜0(U), we have Pi = ν(S′ − f ′(Di)).
With Proposition 3.3 and Theorem 4.1, we get d(ν, µ) ≤ δt.
From Proposition 4.2 we derive P1 ≤ µ(expand(S, δt)−f ′(D1)) and P2 ≥ µ(S2)
where S2 = expand(S,−δt) − f ′(D2). In the following, we denote by S1 the
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set expand(S, δt) \ expand(S,−δt)) − f ′(D1. The additivity property of measures
grants us µ(expand(S, δt)− f ′(D1)) = µ(expand(S,−δt)− f ′(D1)) +µ(S1). Con-
dition 5 can be expressed in term of the measure as: ∀S ∈ S, r ∈ Rm, µ(S) ≤
exp (‖r‖/∆f′)µ(S − r). From this inequality and the one of P1, we can derive, since
‖f ′(D2)− f ′(D1)‖ ≤ ∆f ′ : P1 ≤ exp()P2 + µ(S1).
Since the probability is absolutely continuous according to the Lebesgue measure
(Condition 5), we can express the probability with a density function p: ∀S ∈ S,
µ(S) =
∫
S
p(x)dλ. We derive: ∀S ∈ S,minx∈S p(x) ≤ µ(S)/λ(S). By applying
this property on S2, we get: minx∈S2 p(x) ≤ µ(S2)/λ(S2). Since the set is compact,
the minimum is reached : ∃x0 ∈ S2, p(x0) ≤ P2/λ(S2). By a triangular inequality,
we get : ∀x ∈ S1, d(x, x0) ≤ ∆f ′ + L + δt. Hence, from Condition 5 we derive:
∀x ∈ S1, p(x) ≤ exp
(
(∆f′+L+δt)/∆f′
)
p(x0). Then since µ(S1) =
∫
S1
p(x)dλ:
µ(S1) ≤ exp((∆f′+L+δt)/∆f′)λ(S1)/λ(S2)P2. Because the Lebesgue measure is invari-
ant by translation, we can rewrite this inequality with R from Definition 4.2: µ(S1) ≤
exp((∆f′+L+δt)/∆f′)RP2. Finally, since we already get P1 ≤ exp()P2 + µ(S1), we
obtain : P1 ≤ (1 +R exp(L+δt/∆f′)) exp()P2.
5. Application to the Laplacian noise in one dimension
In our main theorem 4.1, we state a general result which is parametric in the dimen-
sionm of the range space, in the law n(U) for the added noise, and on the implementa-
tion of this noise. Now, we consider the original case for which differential privacy has
been used, i.e. the case where m = 1 and n(U) is distributed according to the standard
linear Laplacian. This specific case will allow us to quantify the loss numerically. We
show that the proposed mechanism 4 is still unsafe. Indeed, as we show, a set Mr that
would prevent a large error δt would be too small to be useful. To solve this problem,
we propose an improvement on the implementation of the random noise and show that,
in this new setting, the loss is negligible.
5.1. Requirements and architecture assumptions
To be able to give numerical result we need to define which mechanism we use and
where it is implemented.
Differential privacy mechanism. We consider some intended degree of privacy . We
consider the function f which ranges over some interval Mr = [m,M ]. We denote by
r = M −m the size of this interval. We also express the sensitivity as a function of a
parameter N : ∆f = r/N . If the query is the summation of some subset of the entries,
N represents the minimal number of entries that will be in the subset by the query.
A Laplace noise that provides -differential privacy in the exact semantics must
have scale parameter ∆f/. Now, to respect the pattern of mechanism 4, we need to
decide the truncation range and the rounding function. Since f ranges over [m,M ], we
truncate the result and return an error if we output a result outside of this range. For
this example, we decide to round the result so that the result is a multiple of r/252−s
where s is an integer representing the number of significant digits that are removed.
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Assumptions about the machine architecture. We consider that the mechanism is im-
plemented into a machine with the floating-point architecture following the IEEE stan-
dard [12] on 64 bits.
We assume that the uniform generator used here returns a multiple of 2−53.
The next step consists of picking a number according to the Laplace distribution.
The easier way to achieve this is to use the following formula.
X = n(U) = −b sgn(U − 1/2) ln(1− 2|U − 1/2|)
Indeed, if U is a random uniform variable then n(U) is a centered Laplacian distribu-
tion with scale parameter b. This standard technique to get a Laplace distribution is
convenient since its implementation just uses arithmetic operators, absolute values and
the logarithm function that can be implemented without any loss of precision [10].
n(u) = ∆f/sgn(u− 1/2) ln(1− 2|u− 1/2|). (7)
The computation of the logarithm is in two steps. First, from the representation of
u = um2
ue where um is the mantissa and ue the exponent of u, we have ln(u) =
ue ln(2) + ln(um). Hence, we reduce the problem to computing the logarithm for
numbers in [1, 2[. This algorithm has been proved full-precision for some implementa-
tions [13], meaning that the error made by the algorithm is just the one due to the finite
representation.
5.2. Weakness of the mechanism
Initial uniform noise. As we explained in the subsection 3.3, since the uniform ran-
dom generator returns numbers that are multiple of 2−53, the δ0 parameter defined in
definition 3.1 is δ0 = 2−53.
Closeness of n and n′. In order to apply our theorem, we need to prove that condition
1 is satisfied. By proposition 3.1, it is sufficient to prove that, in the interval of interest,
n(u) is k-Lipschitz and that |n(u)− n′(u)| ≤ δn.
Proposition 5.1. In our case, n is k-Lipschitz with
k =
2∆f

exp
(
r
∆f
)
Proof Since the result n(u) is always truncated if the final result of our mechanism
is outside of [m,M ], this means, since f(D) belongs to [m,M ], that the result of n(u)
is always truncated when |n(u)| ≥ r = (M −m). So we are interested in knowing the
k factor for which n is k-Lipschitz in n−1([−2r, 2r]). Since n ∈ C1 (its derivative is
continuous), it is enough to compute the maximal value of its derivative in this interval.
So first we have to compute n−1([−2r, 2r]). The equation |n(u)| = r is equivalent to
|∆f/sgn (u− 1/2) ln (1− 2 |u− 1/2|)| = r. We derive
u = 1/2± (1/2− 1/2 exp(−r/∆f)) . (8)
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We have n./u. = ∆f/2(1−2|u−1/2|). Finally, the derivative is maximal on the limit of the
interval computed in (8)
n./u. ≤ 2∆f exp(r/∆f )/ = k.
So our function n is k-Lipschitz for the previously defined value of k.
This factor is too big as we now illustrate in a numerical application. Indeed, as we
can see, this factor depends exponentially on r/∆f . Now, in case of a sum query where
values are in the interval [0,∆f ], if the database contains N rows, the result will be in
[0, N∆f ]. Since we would like the truncation not to truncate any possible true results,
we would like r = N∆f . Finally, we get k = 2∆f/ exp(N).
We have now to compute δt = kδ0 + δn. We have, in our architecture δ0 = 2−53.
Since summation and multiplication of values only generate errors up to their precision
and that the log function is full precision, the computational error δn will be less than
2−53∆f/r. Therefore it is negligible. Finally, we have δt ≈ 2∆fδ0/ exp(N).
Rounding the result. The parameter R in Definition 4.2 is
R = 4δt/L−2δt.
This implies that, at least, 2δt < L. On the other hand, L should be not bigger than
∆f/ otherwise the impact of the rounding on the utility of the answer would be bigger
than the one due to the noise. This means that we have 2δt < ∆f/. We can expand this
inequality to get
4∆f δ0/ exp(N) < ∆f/,
from which we derive N < 51 ln(2). The standard deviation of the exact mechanism
is d = ∆f/ and corresponds to the average shift between the true value and the returned
value, hence, the ratio D = d/∆f corresponds to some “relative expected deviation”.
From the last inequality and the fact that 51 ln(2) < 36, we get D > N/36. Since to be
useful the relative deviation should be less than 1, the protocol does not work for query
summing more than 36 rows, which is not acceptable (N is normally greater than one
hundred).
5.3. Improvement of the implementation
The last mechanism was not able to provide accurate results in a large range. To
solve this problem, we need the uniform generator to be able to return numbers smaller
than 2−53. One way to do that consists in generating the mantissa of the number in the
classical way and then generating the exponent according to an exponential law as in
[15]. One slightly different way to proceed consists in using a formula equivalent to
(7): n(u, v) = ∆f/v ln(|u|), where v ∈ {−1, 1} and P (v = 1) = 0.5.
If we decompose u between its mantissa 1+um and its exponent−(1+ue), which
is a positive integer, we obtain n(u, v) = v∆f/ ln(|(1+um)2−(1+ue)|). Therefore, we
derive n(um, ue, v) = v∆f/ (ln (|1 + um|)− ln(2)(1 + ue)).
If we want U to be uniform, then the probability to pick u = (1 + um)2−(1+ue)
has to be proportional to the interval in the exact semantics which is rounded in u for
that um has to be uniform and ue has to be picked according to an exponential law, i.e.
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P (ue = n+ 1) = 2
−(1+ue). To generate such a distribution, we can, for instance, flip
a coin and count the number of heads before getting odd.
Since there is no rounding error when computing integer random values, we only
have to consider errors depending on um. But, now, for um ∈ [0, 1], n(um) is ∆f/-
Lipschitz. Finally, the total error δt will be of the same order as the precision of the
returned result, i.e δt = 2−52r.
The parameter R defined in 4.2 is now very close to 0: R = 4δt/L−2δt. Since
L = 2−52+sr and δt = 2−52r, we derive R = 4/2s−2. Finally the ′ parameter
′ = + ln(1 +R exp(L+δt/∆f)) can be rewritten with the computed values
′ = + ln(1 + 4/2s−2 exp(L+δt/∆f)).
If we set s = 22, then we have 2s  1. By approximating 1 + 2s ≈ 2s we get
′ ≈  + ln(1 + 2−s+2 exp(2sr/252∆f)). When we use the parameter N = r/∆f ,
′ ≈  + ln(1 + 2−s+2 exp(2sN/252)). Since N is an indicator of the number of
the entries in the database, we can assume that N  230. So the exponential is
approximately equals to 1. Then since ln(1 + x) ≤ x, and 210 ≈ 103 we conclude that
′ ≈ + 10−6.
6. Application to the Laplacian noise in two dimensions
One of the nice features of our theorem 4.1 is its ability to deal with multi-di-
mensional variables. Here, we present the case in which queries return points in a
Euclidean plane. This domain is used, for instance, in geo-location (see [1]). We
consider the same architecture as in the previous section. The new difficulty, here, is to
generate a random variable with a bivariate Laplace distribution. Since our definition
of the multivariate Laplacian is not a standard one, there is no generation protocol in
the literature. To generate this noise, we can generate it in polar coordinates and then
converts it into Cartesian ones.
The probability density function in Cartesian coordinates is
p(x, y) = K exp(b
√
|x− x0|2 + |y − y0|2)
Following [1], we consider a transformation to polar coordinates.
Proposition 6.1. The distribution above can be generated with the following equation:
n(ur, uθ) = (−(W−1(ur−1/e)+1/e) cos(2piuθ),−(W−1(ur−1/e)+1/e) sin(θ))
where W−1 is the negative Lambert function characterized by W (x) exp(W (x)) = x.
Proof The radial probability density function is expressed by the following formula:
p(r, θ) = b
2
/2pir exp(br). Hence the cumulative function for the radius is Cb(r) = 1−
(1+br) exp(−br). To generate the random variable, we have to compute r = C−1b (u).
We have Cb(r) = u is equivalent to −(1 + br) exp(−(1 + br)) = u−1/b. To solve this
equation, we need to introduce the Lambert function defined as the reciprocal of the
function f(x) = x exp(x) Since f is not injective, there actually exist two functions
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W0 andW−1 such thatW (x) exp(W (x)) = x. Here we use theW−1 negative function
defined on [−1/e, 0[. Finally, we get the equation r = −W−1(u−1/e)+1/b. Once we have
got the radius, the angle is obtained by multiplying a uniform random variable in [0, 1[
by 2pi. Finally, we convert (r, θ) into Cartesian coordinates.
While Lambert functions are not algebraic, there exist iterative algorithms to com-
pute them with arbitrary precision [5]. The problem we had with the logarithm in the
last section is still relevant here. Indeed, even if we can bound the computational er-
rors, the maximal value that the initial generator can provide is not close enough to 1
to return very large values. In order to avoid a too narrow truncation domain, we might
add an additional protocol. Here, however, we will neither describe such a protocol,
nor actually compute the maximal error that can be expected with such an algorithm.
In the following, we just assume that the error is at most some δr value.
Truncation. Since most of the time the domain studied is bound (for instance the public
transportation of a city is inside the limit of the city), we can do a truncation. However,
we recall that our truncation is made for robustness purpose and not just for utility
reasons. Hence, if our domain of interest is a circle, we will not choose Mr to be the
same circle because the probability that the truncation would return an exception would
be too high (more than one half if the true result is on the circumference).
Robustness of n. As in the previous section, we do not analyze an actual implementa-
tion but we care about the k factor used for Condition 1. First, we analyze for which
kC(,(Mr)) the function C−1 is k-Lipschitz in [0,(Mr)]. Since C is differential,
this question is equivalent to find the inverse of the minimal value taken by its deriva-
tive function on the interval C−1 ([0,(Mr)]). By computing this minimum value, we
get
kC(,(Mr)) = exp((Mr))/2+r2.
On the other hand, the computation of θ is just a multiplication by 2pi of the uniform
generator hence kθ = 2pi. Then, with the conversion (r, θ) 7→ (r cos(θ), r sin(θ))
from polar coordinates to Cartesian coordinates we obtain the global k factor: k =√
kC(,(Mr))2 + 2pi(Mr). Let δn be the distance between n and n′, and δ0 be the
error of the uniform generator. From Proposition 3.3 we get:
δt =
√
kC(,(Mr))2 + 2pi(Mr)δ0 + δn.
Rounding the answer. We now compute the parameter R in (4.2). The rounding is
made in the Cartesian coordinates, hence, the inverse image of any returned value is
a square S of length L. Note that expand(S, δt) is included in the square of length
L + 2δt and expand(S,−δt) is a square of length L − 2δt. Hence, the ratio value is
smaller than R = (L+2δt/L−2δt)2.
Differential privacy. By Theorem 4.1 we get that (the implementation of) our mecha-
nism is ′-differentially private with ′ = + ln(1 + (L+2δt/L−2δt)2 exp(L+δt/∆f′)).
Here, as for the previous example, we need to avoid to truncate outside of a very small
circle. While we will not provide details here, one way to solve this problem in float-
ing point precision consists in generating all possible floating points numbers instead
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of just the ones which are multiples of 2−53. That way, with an implementation of
W−1 which is full precision, we can get a much smaller δ0.
7. Conclusion
This paper concerns the influence of rounding errors in mechanisms achieving dif-
ferential privacy: a security protocol that relies on real-valued random numbers gen-
eration. Existing studies on differential privacy focus either only on the mathematical
properties or on technical problems which are particular to a given implementation.
Here, we have presented a method to quantify the loss of privacy induced by finite pre-
cision. It should be possible to apply this method to most kinds of implementation and
computer architecture that achieve differential privacy.
With this model, we have been able to prove that the additive Mechanism 1 which is
safe from a theoretical point of view breaks the differential privacy once implemented
in a finite precision architecture. This loss has two origins: first, extreme values can
cuase significant errors, and secondly, locally, last digits can provide fingerprints of the
secret. Our solution solves these two problems: the last digits leakage has been fixed
by a rounding procedure and the extreme perturbations by raising an error when the
result is outside some range of values.
While proposing these fixes, we have done a quantitative analysis to measure the
loss of privacy induced by finite-precision representation. We have proved that when
the fixes on the mechanism are implemented, the differential privacy parameter is just
increased by some additive factor.
To analyze the relevance of our general result, we have applied it for the standard
method (Laplacian in one dimension). This strict application was not really satisfac-
tory: in general, the loss is too important. Therefore, we have proposed a last fix
where the uniform random generator of Mechanism 2 has been replaced by a dynamic
procedure that provides as many random bits as necessary to grant differential privacy.
Finally, we have explained how to implement a bivariate Laplace noise and how to
compute its loss once implemented. Here there is no obvious way to allow a random
value to be generated in a large range.
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